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The Logicality of Language is the hypothesis that the language system has access to a2
‘natural’ logic that can identify and filter out as unacceptable expressions that have trivial3
meanings—i.e., that are true/false in all possible worlds or situations in which they are4
defined. This hypothesis helps explain otherwise puzzling patterns concerning the distribution5
of various functional terms and phrases. Despite its promise, Logicality vastly over-generates6
unacceptability assignments. Most solutions to this problem rest on specific stipulations about7
the properties of logical form—roughly, the level of linguistic representation which feeds into8
the interpretation procedures—and have substantial implications for traditional philosophical9
disputes about the nature of language. Specifically, Contextualism and Semantic Minimalism,10
construed as competing hypothesis about the nature and degree of context-sensitivity at the11
level of logical form, suggest different approaches to the over-generation problem. In this12
paper, I explore the implications of pairing Logicality with various forms of Contextualism13
and Semantic Minimalism. I argue that, to adequately solve the over-generation problem,14
Logicality should be implemented in a constrained Contextualist framework.15
Keywords: Logicality, Contextualism, Semantic Minimalism, semantics vs. pragmatics,16
natural logic, modularity, grammaticality, triviality, quantifiers Words: 12,12817
1 Introduction18
According to the ‘generative’ tradition in linguistics and philosophy, the human language19
system consists of a (recursive) structure building device and a compositional interpretation20
procedure which together determine the class of expressions that belong to a natural language21
such as English. The ‘Logicality of language’ is the hypothesis that the language system also22
includes a kind of ‘natural logic’ that can perform certain unconscious, automatic inferences23
(Gajewski 2002, 2008a, Fox 2000, Fox & Hackl 2007, Chierchia 2013, Abrusán 2014, Del Pinal24
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2019). On this view, the language system can identify and filter-out as strictly unacceptable1
expressions that, although syntactically well-formed, are uninformative in the sense of being2
‘trivial’, i.e., are either true or false in every world or situation in which they are defined.3
This hypothesis is motivated by acceptability patterns which capture the distribution of4
various functional terms and phrases, such as the patterns for quantifiers in (1)-(3), where the5
sentences in (a)-(b) illustrate an instance of the generalization in (c). The accounts cited in6
each case show that the target generalization can be derived from (i) reasonable hypotheses7
about the semantics of functional terms, and (ii) the assumption that expressions which are8
logically/trivially true or false are marked as strictly unacceptable.9
(1) Connected but-exceptives: (von Fintel 1993)10
a. *Some student/s but John passed the exam. [trivially false]11
b. No student but John passed the exam.12
c. Generalization: Only universal (positive/negative) quantifiers can host but-13
exceptive phrases in their restrictors.14
(2) There-existentials: (Barwise & Cooper 1981)15
a. *There is every red apple in the garden. [trivially true]16
b. There are some red apples in the garden.17
c. Generalization: Only weak determiners can occur in there-existential sentences.18
(3) Polarity sensitive items: (Chierchia 2013)19
a. *Mary has any marbles. [trivially false]20
b. Mary doesn’t have any marbles.21
c. Generalization: Negative polarity items such as any are only licensed in down-22
ward entailing environments.23
The reason why each of the marked expressions is trivial is opaque to pre-theoretical reflection.24
Indeed, the accounts which derive the target generalizations include some of the most elegant25
and sophisticated analyses in formal semantics. Proponents of Logicality have uncovered many26
systematic patterns involving expressions which (i) are arguably syntactically well-formed,27
(ii) can be shown to be trivial, and (iii) are judged as strictly unacceptable. Triviality-28
based analyses shed light on the distribution of quantifiers, attitude verbs, numerals and29
exhaustification operators, among other functional terms and phrases.30
Despite its considerable empirical payoffs, the Logicality of language hypothesis faces an31
important challenge, recognized from the outset by its main proponents (Gajewski 2002, Fox &32
Hackl 2007, Chierchia 2013, Abrusán 2014). If the language system includes a computational33
system which automatically identifies and filters out as strictly unacceptable expressions which34
are logically trivial, why are many of the intuitively most obvious examples of tautologies and35
contradictions, such as those in (4), strictly acceptable (even if sometimes a bit odd)?36
(4) Superficial tautologies and contradictions:37
a. If John is a cheater, then John is a cheater.38
b. It is raining and it is not raining.39
Why does the ‘natural logic’ of language identify as trivially false and hence unacceptable40
expressions like (1a) and (3a) but not the intuitively simpler contradiction in (4b)? Similarly41
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why does the language system filter out as unacceptable trivially true expressions like (2a)1
but not superficial tautologies like (4a)? Proponents of Logicality have to find a principled2
way of separating the class of trivial expressions which feel ‘ungrammatical’ from the class3
of (superficial) trivialities which are strictly acceptable. Call this the ‘over-generation of4
unacceptability’ problem.5
The project of finding an implementation of Logicality that addresses the over-generation6
problem is of considerable theoretical interest. As we will see, solutions to this problem rest on7
substantive assumptions about the nature of logical form, i.e., about the level of representation8
that is the input to the interpretation function or procedures. For this reason, the project of9
finding a viable implementation of Logicality interacts in meaningful ways with traditional10
philosophical debates between Contextualists and Semantic Minimalists, which are centered11
on disputes about the nature of logical form. According to Contextualists, most/all terms12
can be represented as (or can be modified by) characters whose open parameters have to13
be fixed by context before they can determine an extension given a world/situation (e.g.,14
Carston 2002, Stanley 2007, Recanati 2010, Rothschild & Segal 2009). Minimalists hold, in15
contrast, that while natural languages have a class of genuinely context-sensitive terms (incl.,16
demonstratives and indexicals), most open-class terms do not have covert context-sensitive17
parameters (e.g., Borg 2004, Cappelen & Lepore 2005). Logicality can be combined with a18
Contextualist or a Minimalist conception of logical form—and as we will see, each approach19
issues in a range of unique yet reasonably promising solutions to the over-generation problem.20
To begin to appreciate what is distinctive about Contextualism and Semantic Minimalism,21
taken as solutions to the over-generation problem, consider how each approach may take22
advantage of a key difference between the ungrammatical trivialities in (1a)-(3a) and the23
superficial, acceptable trivialities in (4). This difference depends on distinguishing between24
‘functional’ or ‘logical’ terms (e.g., all, few, any, and, but) and ‘content’ or ‘referential’ terms25
(e.g., cheater, John, rain, love). As a first pass (see §6), we can say that functional terms are26
typically assigned high types, their semantic effect is inference-based, and they make up the27
‘closed’ class vocabulary which shows limited variation within and across languages. Content28
terms, in contrast, are typically assigned lower types which correspond to entities, events,29
sets of or relations between members of those basic types, and they make up the ‘open’ class30
vocabulary which can change in relatively unconstrained ways within and across languages.31
Crucially, in cases like (1a)-(3a) the trivialities depend only on the configuration of functional32
or logical terms (see §2-3 below and Gajewski 2002, 2009, Chierchia 2013, Abrusán 2014,33
Del Pinal 2019). Yet in cases like (4), their status as trivial also depends on the identity of34
each token of their content terms. Building on that distinction between strictly unacceptable35
and acceptable, ‘superficial’ trivialities, consider a Contextualist and a Minimalist friendly36
proposal for tackling the over-generation problem. Let us begin with the former:37
Logicality + Modulation. The meaning of all content terms (incl., variables which are38
assigned values of the same types) can be modulated by context-sensitive operators39
present in logical form. Expressions whose triviality depends on the co-identity of40
content terms are not seen as trivial because each token can be modulated in slightly41
different ways in its local context, thereby avoiding triviality. Crucially, modulation42
over content terms doesn’t help rescue expressions whose triviality depends solely on43
the configuration of their logical/functional terms. For logical terms, unlike content44
ones, can’t be modulated.45
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For example, (1a) is marked as ungrammatical because modulating the meaning of terms like1
student, pass and exam doesn’t ‘rescue’ the expression from triviality. In contrast, (4a) is not2
marked as ungrammatical because modulating each token of cheater in slightly different ways3
rescues the expression from triviality (see §3.1). Crucially, this approach to the over-generation4
problem is not available to Semantic Minimalists—for it appeals to (semantic) modulation5
operators over all content terms and variables of any ‘referential’ types—but other promising6
approaches are compatible with their core commitments. Consider the following ‘syntactic’7
approach:8
Logicality + Syntactic skeletons. There is a level of representation which is sensitive to9
logical/functional terms, but is blind to the specific semantic value and identity of10
content terms. Grammatically-relevant triviality is determined at this level. Accord-11
ingly, expressions whose triviality depends only on the configuration of logical terms12
can be proven to be trivial, whereas those whose triviality also depends on seeing13
the co-identity of their content terms are not seen as trivial. At the (later) stage of14
processing in which the meaning/identity of content terms is fully represented, there15
is no rampant (linguistically triggered) context-sensitivity.16
From this perspective, (1a) is marked as ungrammatical because we can prove that it is trivial17
even if we do not know what specific semantic value each of its content terms ultimately18
receives. In contrast, (4a) is not marked as strictly ungrammatical because, to determine19
if it is trivial, we need to know whether each token of cheater receives the same semantic20
value—and this is not something that can be determined at the level of syntactic representation21
in which grammatically relevant trivialities are computed (see §3.2). This syntactic approach22
was adopted by early proponents of Logicality to tackle the over-generation problem (e.g.,23
Gajewski 2002, Fox & Hackl 2007, Chierchia 2013)24
The aim of this paper is to show that a refined version of the Contextualist position25
of Logicality + Modulation is superior to various implementations of Logicality which are26
inspired by or compatible with Semantic Minimalism. My argument has two parts. The first27
argues against popular approaches to the over-generation problem along the lines of Logicality28
+ Syntactic skeletons (§2-§4). The key cases involve acceptable superficial trivialities similar29
to (4a)-(4b), except that the relevant individual terms or predicates are syntactically co-bound30
or in some form of anaphoric relation. I will argue that only Logicality + Modulation—31
according to which logical forms include general modulation operators over content terms and32
individual/predicate variables—can explain why these variants of superficial trivialities are33
strictly acceptable. The second part examines three novel, Minimalist-friendly attempts to34
solve the over-generation problem while avoiding the shortcomings of Logicality + Syntactic35
skeletons (§5). One proposal is that triviality is checked only within minimal syntactic phases,36
another is that triviality is determined relative to a specific kind of non-classical natural logic,37
and a third is that triviality is a result of lexical presuppositions. None of these proposals38
appeal to semantic modulation operators, or posit any kind of ubiquitous context-sensitivity39
across the lexicon. While each has advantages, I argue that, ultimately, only Logicality +40
Modulation can maintain the triviality-based accounts of patterns such as (1)-(3)—and similar41
generalizations which help capture the distribution of functional terms and phrases—without42
simultaneously over-generating unacceptability assignments for various kinds of ‘superficial’,43
acceptable trivialities. Importantly, it does not follow from my argument that any version44
of Contextualism is a suitable partner of Logicality: as already alluded, I will argue that we45
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need a version in which modulation is computed by context-sensitive operators present in1
logical form and is confined to content terms and variables of the corresponding referential2
types (cf., Mart́ı 2006, Stanley 2007). Radical Contextualism—roughly, the (popular) view3
that all terms can be modulated to increase the coherence or utility of utterances—has to be4
rejected, if Logicality is accepted.5
2 The Logicality of language: A case study of quantifiers and exceptives6
According to Logicality, the language system can identify and filter-out expressions which are7
trivial, i.e., true or false in all worlds/situations in which they are defined. This hypothesis8
can be used to derive generalizations, such as those in (1)-(3), which capture the distribution9
of various functional terms and phrases, yet it should be implemented in a way that avoids10
the over-generation problem. To evaluate different implementations of Logicality, it will be11
useful to begin by reviewing one triviality-based analysis in detail. This section presents12
an influential triviality-based account of exceptive-but phrases, due to von Fintel (1993).13
Additional acceptability patterns and accounts will be discussed in later sections.14
The basic contrast concerning which quantifiers can host exceptive-but phrases in their15
restrictors is repeated in (5), and the general acceptability pattern is summarized in (6).16
(5) a. *Some student/s but John passed the exam.17
b. Every student but John passed the exam.18
(6) Generalization:19
a. 3: every, all, none, no20
b. 7: the rest21
The quantifiers that can and those that can’t host exceptive-but phrases in their restrictors22
belong to the same syntactic category—partly for this reason, there is no principled syntactic23
explanation for the acceptability pattern in (6). In contrast, the class of quantifiers that can24
host exceptive-but phrases share a unique semantic characterization: they are the universal25
(positive/negative) quantifiers. This characterization provides a clue for deriving the target26
pattern: formulate a plausible entry for exceptive-but and examine how it interacts with27
universal vs. non-universal quantifiers.28
Suppose that expressions like (5a) and (5b) are parsed as in (7). A natural hypothesis is29
that but subtracts the set denoted by its complement from that denoted by the next term it30
combines with, as captured in (8).31
(7) [[D [A [but C]]] P ]32
(8) J[[D [A [but C]]] P ]K = 1 iff
{
(i) C 6= ∅
(ii) D(A− C)(P ) = 133
Applied to (5b), this simple subtraction hypothesis generates the truth-conditions in (9):34
(9) J[[EveryD [studentA [but JohnC ]]] passedP ]K = 1 iff35
(i) {John} 6= ∅36
(ii) {x : x is student} − {John} ⊆ {x : x passed}37
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Now, consider a word w1 in which every student including John passed the exam. (5b) is1
intuitively false w1. Yet the truth-conditions in (9) predict that it should be true, since in2
w1 every student other than John passed the exam. This suggests that a simple subtraction3
operation, as in (8), can’t be the whole semantic contribution of exceptive-but. von Fintel4
(1993) proposes instead an analysis closer to (10), which adds condition (iii) to the original5
subtraction-based entry. This captures the idea that the complement of but should be the6
smallest set one can subtract from the restrictor of D while preserving the truth of the7
quantified statement.8
(10) J[[D [A [but C]]] P ]K = 1 iff

(i) C 6= ∅
(ii) D(A− C)(P ) = 1
(iii) ∀S[D(A− S)(P ) = 1→ C ⊆ S]︸ ︷︷ ︸
‘the least you can take out’ condition
9
Applied to (5b), the entry in (10) generates the truth-conditions in (11):10
(11) J[[EveryD [studentA [but JohnC ]]] passedP ]K = 1 iff11
(i) {John} 6= ∅12
(ii) {x : x is student} − {John} ⊆ {x : x passed}13
(iii) ∀S[{x : x is student} − S ⊆ {x : x passed} → {John} ⊆ S]14
Consider again w1, where every student including John passed. This analysis now correctly15
predicts that (5b) is false in w1. For although conditions (i)-(ii) are obviously satisfied—since16
every student other than John passed in w1—(iii) isn’t. Simply let S = ∅, then the antecedent17
of (iii) is true while the consequent is false. This analysis also captures cases in which (5b) is18
intuitively true, such as a world w2 in which John did not pass but every other student did19
pass. The truth-conditions in (11) are satisfied in w2. Conditions (i)-(ii) are satisfied because20
every student other than John passed, and (iii) because any set substituted for S which21
doesn’t include John—such as the empty set or the singleton set of any other student—would22
make the antecedent false, hence the whole conditional true. It is easy to check that the23
analysis in (10) assigns appropriate truth-conditions to exceptive-but sentences with the other24
(positive/negative) universal quantifiers, at least in direct instantiations of (7).125
1 Two clarifications. First, on this version of von Fintel’s (1993) account, the first argument of exceptive-
but is of type < e, t >—i.e., takes characteristic functions of sets of entities. In cases like (11), this
requires a type shifting operation from John to {John}. While other compositional routes are explored
in von Fintel (1993), all still require that but be assigned a high type. Second, (10) is intended to
capture the meaning of but, not of all exceptive terms/phrases. Indeed, most semanticists think that
except (for) has a freer/more inclusive distribution than but. This is partly explained by assuming
that the former doesn’t include the ‘least you can take out’ condition (iii). To be sure, Gajewski
(2008b), Hirsch (2016) and Crnič (2018) have explored the hypothesis that the ‘least you can take
out’ condition is not directly contributed by but ; rather, it arises from the interaction between but
(taken as just a set subtraction operation) and an exhaustification operator. On these views, the
difference in the distribution between but and except (for) is captured by stipulating that while but
phrases obligatorily trigger exhaustification, except (for) phrases trigger it only optionally. For simple
sentences like those in (5), these accounts also predict the acceptability pattern in (6), for reasons
parallel to those we present below. Accordingly—and because details of the compositional source of
(iii) don’t affect broader issues about how best to implement Logicality—I focus here on von Fintel’s
original (1993) account.
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In addition to capturing the intuitive truth-conditions of acceptable exceptive-but sen-1
tences, the analysis in (10) is also crucial to derive the acceptability patterns summarized in2
(6). The key step is to recognize that the universal quantifiers in (6a) are all left-downward-3
entailing—this is what guarantees that there can be minimal exceptions to the corresponding4
universal generalizations, and that sentences like (5a) are predicted to have contingent truth-5
conditions, as we just saw. In contrast, left-upward-entailing quantifiers—e.g., some, (at least)6
three, (at least) four, etc.—hosting an exceptive-but phrase in their restrictors, always fail to7
simultaneously satisfy (i)-(iii), thereby generating truth-conditions that are trivially false.8
(12) D is a left upward entailing quantifier iff ∀A,A+, P s.t.9
JDK(A)(P ) = 1 & A ⊆ A+, JDK(A+)(P ) = 110
The reason for this is simple. Suppose JDK(A)(P ) = 1 and that the restrictor A = A+ − C,11
where C 6= ∅. If D is left-upward-entailing, it follows that JDK(A+)(P ) = 1, since A ⊆ A+.12
That is, one could always have subtracted from A+ a smaller set than C—including the13
empty set—and still get a true statement. Accordingly, expressions with left-upward-entailing14
quantifiers with exceptive-but phrases in their restrictors can’t satisfy the ‘least you can take15
out’ condition (iii). Given Logicality, such trivially false expressions are marked as strictly16
unacceptable.17
To illustrate this result—i.e., that left-upward-entailing quantifiers, when hosting exceptive-18
but phrases in their restrictors, generate trivial truth-conditions—consider (5a). Given the19
account of but in (10), (5a) is assigned the truth-conditions in (13):20
(13) J[[SomeD [studentA [but JohnC ]]] passedP ]K = 1 iff21
(i) {John} 6= ∅22
(ii) ({x : x is student} − {John}) ∩ {x : x passed} 6= ∅23
(iii) ∀S[({x : x is student} − S) ∩ {x : x passed} 6= ∅ → {John} ⊆ S]24
Obviously, these conditions are not satisfied in worlds where no student passed. What we need25
to check, then, is if they are satisfied in any worlds in which at least some students passed.26
(i)-(ii) are only satisfied in worlds in which at least some students other than John passed.27
Amongst those worlds, there are two cases to check for condition (iii): worlds in which John28
also passed, and worlds in which he didn’t. In either case, let S = ∅. The antecedent of (iii)29
is then true—since some students passed in those worlds—while the consequent is obviously30
false. Hence in any world in which conditions (i)-(ii) of (13) are satisfied, the ‘least you31
can take out’ condition (iii) won’t be. Since (5a) is assigned trivial truth-conditions, the32
Logicality hypothesis correctly predicts that it is marked as unacceptable.33
The final class we need to consider is that of left non-monotonic quantifiers such as exactly34
3, most, and few. The standard view is that these quantifiers can’t host exceptive-but phrases35
in their restrictors, as captured in (14):36
(14) a. *Exactly three students but John passed the exam.37
b. *Most students but John passed the exam.38
c. *Few students but John passed the exam.39
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Despite some complications, von Fintel’s (1993) account also arguably predicts this result.1
Let us focus on (14a). Given the account of but in (10), (14a) is assigned the truth-conditions2
in (15):3
(15) J[[Exactly threeD [studentsA [but JohnC ]]] passedP ]K = 1 iff4
(i) {John} 6= ∅ &5
(ii) card(({x : x is student} − {John}) ∩ {x : x passed}) = 3 &6
(iii) ∀S[card(({x : x is student} − S) ∩ {x : x passed}) = 3→ {John} ⊆ S]7
The truth-conditions in (15) are clearly not satisfied in worlds where no student passed, as8
well as in worlds where exactly one, two, or at least four students (excluding John) passed.9
To determine if they are trivially false, we have to check if there are any worlds which satisfy10
them. There are two relevant remaining cases to consider. The first consists of worlds where11
exactly three students passed and John is not in that set, i.e., he did not pass. This would12
satisfy conditions (i)-(ii), but not (iii). For let S = ∅, then the antecedent of (iii) is true13
while the consequent is false. The second consists of worlds where exactly three students14
other than John passed and John also passed. This would again satisfy conditions (i)-(ii):15
the set of students subtracting {John} includes exactly three that passed. But it again fails16
condition (iii). For let S equal any singleton set containing any student other than John who17
passed, then the antecedent of (iii) is true but the consequent is false, since {John} is not a18
subset of any of those singleton sets. It follows that the truth-conditions of (14a) in (15) are19
trivially false, so by Logicality (14a) is correctly predicted to be marked as unacceptable.220
2 Most and few -quantified sentences with but-phrases in their restrictors, such as (14b) and (14c), present
additional complications. For brevity, I focus on the case of most (the case of few is quite similar).
Given the entry for but in (10)—and assuming most means ‘more than half’—(14b) is assigned the
truth-conditions in (A):
(A) J[[MostD [studentsA [but JohnC ]]] passedP ]K = 1 iff
(i) {John} 6= ∅
(ii) card(({x : x is student} − {John}) ∩ {x : x passed}) > 1/2card({x : x is student} −
{John})
(iii) ∀S[card(({x : x is student} − S) ∩ {x : x passed}) > 1/2card({x : x is student} − S)
→ {John} ⊆ S]
It is easy to check that most situations don’t satisfy conditions (i)-(iii). So just like the corresponding
exactly n sentences, (14b) is predicted to come out as false in general, a desirable result insofar as we
are trying to show that (14b) is unacceptable because it has trivial truth-conditions. However, there is
a type of situation in which the conditions in (A) are satisfied. Suppose there are just two students,
incl. John, and that only John failed. (i)-(ii) are satisfied because the cardinality of the set of students
excluding John who passed is greater than that of half the set of students excluding John. (iii) is
satisfied because if S = ∅, the antecedent of (iii) is false (since one student failed and one passed), and
if S is the singleton set of the other student, the antecedent of (iii) is again false (since John, the only
other student, did not pass). Either way, the conditional in (iii) comes out true. It follows that, on
this account, sentences like (14b) may be true but only when their restrictor is a singleton set.
However, building on Heim (1991), Hirsch (2016), a.o., has noted that most-sentences seem to be
infelicitous when interpreters know or presuppose that they have a singleton set as a restrictor (either
of individuals or pluralities). This observation is motivated—independently of our target sentences—by
examples like #most tallest student/s in the class passed and #most of my parents came to visit.
One way of accounting for this observation is to argue that (under certain conditions) most-sentences
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Summing up, using independently justified entries for the relevant functional terms,1
we have identified a semantically definable class of quantificational determiners which can2
host exceptive-but phrases in their restrictors. Specifically, we have shown that the (posi-3
tive/negative) universal quantifiers, which are left downward entailing, can host but phrases4
in their restrictors without generating trivial readings. We also showed that, in contrast,5
left-upward entailing quantifiers, and arguably also the left non-monotonic ones, generate6
trivially false readings when hosting but phrases in their restrictors. Based on those results,7
we can derive the distributional generalization in (6) concerning the interaction between8
quantifiers and exceptive-but phrases if we adopt Logicality, i.e., the hypothesis that sentences9
with trivial truth-conditions are identified and marked as unacceptable by the language10
system. Following Fox & Hackl (2007), let us call the computational system that can identify11
and filter out such grammatically relevant trivial expressions the ‘Deductive System’ (DS).12
3 The over-generation problem and Contextualist vs. Minimalist conceptions13
of logical form14
Logicality supports elegant accounts of the distribution of quantifiers and many other functional15
terms and phrases. The problem for any triviality-based account, however, is that many16
superficial tautologies and contradictions, such as those in (4), are strictly acceptable. This17
is unexpected if the language system includes a DS that automatically filters out trivial18
expressions. Can we implement Logicality so that the DS doesn’t over-generate assignments19
of triviality, hence of strict unacceptability? Call ‘L-trivial’ the set of expressions that is20
predicted to be strictly unacceptable relative to each solution of the over-generation problem.21
One way of approaching the over-generation problem is by examining different assumptions22
about logical form, specifically, about the properties of the linguistic representations ‘seen’ by23
the DS. This is where Contextualism and Semantic Minimalism enter the discussion, since24
they issue in distinctive hypotheses about the nature of logical form. In this section, I present25
what I believe are the most promising ways of pairing each of Contextualism and Semantic26
Minimalism with Logicality. Although both proposals help with the over-generation problem,27
I will argue in §4 that only the Contextualist approach provides a fully general solution.28
trigger an obligatory ‘not all’ implicature, which would generate a contradiction whenever the target
restrictor is a singleton set. Alternatively, we could add a singleton set ban as a presupposition on the
restrictor of most. Either way, we would block the one type of situation in which the truth-conditions
in (A) can be satisfied, and predict that (14b) comes out (whenever defined) as trivially false, hence is
marked as unacceptable. Parallel issues (and solutions) apply to few -quantified sentences like (14c).
One final concern. Although the usual judgment amongst linguists working on connected exceptives
is that (14b)-(14c) are indeed unacceptable (see e.g. von Fintel 1993, Gajewski 2008b, Hirsch 2016,
Crnič 2018), a reviewer reports that (14b)-(14c) feel kind of acceptable, even if a bit odd, and to
have the truth-conditions that would be assigned if we use the bare subtraction entry for but in (8).
Assuming von Fintel (1993)’s account, this is not an expected pattern of judgments—yet it is also
not entirely surprising. According to von Fintel (1993), a bare set subtraction operator is part of the
functional (fixed) repertoire of natural languages. Although in English it is usually lexicalized by ‘free’
exceptives such as except (for), it is possible that in some idiolects, or stages of grammaticalization, it
is also lexicalized with but (while triggering only ‘optional’ exhaustification).
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3.1 Contextualism as Logicality + Modulated Logical Forms1
Consider first the version of Contextualism which I propose to adopt as an implementation2
of Logicality. The goal here is to begin to illustrate how it addresses the over-generation3
problem—the full justification for all the components of this account will emerge gradually as4
we discuss, in later sections, additional acceptability patterns. On this version of Contextualism5
modulation is performed by an operator, R, present in logical form. R is a polymorphic type6
operator that is generated as a sister to all and only content terms and variables that can be7
assigned any ‘referential’ types (i.e., individual and predicate variables) (cf. Del Pinal 2019,8
Chierchia 2019). The resulting hypothesis is schematically captured in (16):9
(16) Logicality + Modulated logical forms10
a. Language and its DS ‘see’ modulated LFs: representations like standard LFs11
except that all non-logical terms are arguments of R operators. If an expression12
can’t be ‘rescued’ from triviality by possible modulations of R operators it is13
marked as unacceptable.14
b. To obtain a modulated LF for α15
(i) Identify the minimal projections of any content terms and (individual and16
predicate) variables of α (any ‘referential’ points).17
(ii) Add R as a sister.18
On this view, the DS interacts with modulated logical forms. These representations involve a19
covert R operator—a character interpreted in its local context—which attaches to all content20
terms and variables and can modulate their meaning.3 The class of content terms and21
variables consists of open class terms such as John and red and individual and predicate-22
type variables (for refinements, see §6). Although R is obligatorily inserted in its licensed23
positions, it can be lazy: i.e., it can compute the identity function, which results in a kind of24
vacuous modulation. The modulated logical forms of some basic examples of unacceptable vs.25
(superficial) acceptable trivialities can be represented roughly as follows:26
(17) *Some students but the lazy ones passed the exam.27
a. Modulated LF:28
[[[ Some [ Rc′(students) [ but the Rc′′(lazy ones) ]]] [Rc′′′(passed) ]]29
(18) It is raining and it is not raining.30
a. Modulated LF:31
[[ It is Rc′(raining) ] [ and [ it is not Rc′′(raining) ]]]32
3 Logicality + Modulated LFs builds on constrained Contextualist accounts in which modulation
operators are present in logical form and operate only on non-logical terms (e.g., Szabó & Stanley 2000,
Stanley 2007, Mart́ı 2006, Sauerland 2014). Unlike radical Contextualism, Logicality + Modulated
LFs is compatible with the hypothesis that the language system is relatively modular, and also with
the standard compositional explanations of systematicity and productivity. Indeed, we can stipulate
that the expressive power of R is rather constrained, although this approach is compatible with
various implementations of content class modulation, incl., versions somewhat similar to those recently
explored by Abrusán et al. (2019, 2018), except that on my view modulation over functional/logical
terms should be categorically ruled out.
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Given modulated logical forms, the subset of the L-trivial sentences—the trivial sentences1
that are marked as strictly unacceptable—can be defined as follows:2
(19) L-triviality with modulated logical forms:3
a. A sentence is L-trivial iff (whenever defined) it comes out as uniformly true/false4
for every modulation available to each instance of R. L-trivial sentences are5
marked as ‘ungrammatical’6
b. A sentence is trivial iff (whenever defined) it comes out as uniformly true/false7
for the default value (the identity map) of modulations. Trivial but not L-trivial8
sentences are not marked as ‘ungrammatical’ by the DS.9
To see why Logicality + Modulated LFs helps with the over-generation problem, let us10
examine how it derives that observed acceptability patterns for sentences with exceptive-but11
phrases and for our basic examples of superficial, acceptable trivialities. Let us begin with12
the latter, simpler case. It is easy to see that, on this account, superficial trivialities like (18)13
do not come out as L-trivial. In this specific case, each token of rain can be modulated in a14
slightly different way given its local context, generating readings like ‘it is raining but it is not15
raining hard’. In general, modulated logical forms rescue from L-triviality many ‘superficial’16
(and intuitively acceptable) tautologies and contradictions, for in all these cases their triviality17
depends on computing just the identity function over each token of their non-logical terms.18
The next step is to show that Logicality + Modulated LFs makes the right predictions for19
the acceptability patterns with exceptive-but phrases. The basic contrast is repeated in (20)20
and (21). It is easy to see that (20a) comes out as contingent. For one possible modulation21
of each token of R is the identity function, and in that case (20a) is contingent: e.g., it is22
true in worlds in which all the non-lazy students passed and the lazy ones did not pass, and23
false in worlds in which all the students failed. Consider next (21), given its modulated LF24
in (21a). The aim is to show that we can’t ‘over-rescue’ in this kind of case. Applying the25
entry for exceptive but in (10), we get the interpretation in (21b). From this we can see that26
(21a) is false whenever Rc′′(Jlazy studentsK) = ∅ (or undefined, if condition (i) is treated27
as a presupposition). Accordingly, pick any modulation for Rc′′ that restricts the relevant28
set of lazy students, so long as the resulting set is not empty, the aim being to see if we can29
find a modulation under which it comes out as true. Since some is left-upward entailing, we30
can always subtract less than Rc′′(Jlazy studentsK), whatever that is, since we can simply31
subtract the empty set. As a result, the ‘least you can take out condition’ (= condition (iii))32
of exceptive-but is necessarily violated, and (21a) can’t come out as true.433
(20) All students but the lazy ones passed the exam.34
a. Modulated LF:35
[[ All [ Rc′(students) [ but the Rc′′(lazy ones) ]]] [ Rc′′′(passed) ]]36
4 We said earlier that R can ‘restrict’ (move to a subset of the set denoted by its argument) but also
‘loosen’ (move to a superset of the set denoted by its argument) interpretations. It is easy to see that
cases like (21) cannot be rescued when R ‘loosens’ interpretations: if the set of lazy students is not
the smallest set one can subtract from the set of students while maintaining truth, then, a fortiori, no
superset of that set will be smallest set one can subtract from the set of students while maintaining
truth.
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(i) JRc′′(lazy ones)K 6= ∅ ∧
(ii) JAllK(JRc′(students)K − JRc′′(lazy students)K)(JpassedK) = 1 ∧
(iii) ∀S(JAllK(JRc′(students)K − S)(JRc′′′(passed)K) = 1
→ JRc′′(lazy students)K ⊆ S)
2
(21) *Some students but the lazy ones passed the exam.3
a. Modulated LF:4
[[ Some [ Rc′(students) [ but the Rc′′(lazy ones) ]]] Rc′′′(passed) ]5
b. Interpretation: [Trivially false]6
= 1 iff

(i) JRc′′(lazy ones)K 6= ∅ ∧
(ii) JsomeK(JRc′(students)K − JRc′′(lazy students)K)(JpassedK) = 1 ∧
(iii) ∀S(JsomeK(JRc′(students)K − S)(JRc′′′(passed)K) = 1
→ JRc′′(lazy students)K ⊆ S)
7
Summing up, Logicality + Modulated LFs issues in a promising solution to the over-8
generation problem: while standard examples of superficial trivialities don’t come out as9
L-trivial, the unacceptable examples with exceptive-but do come out as L-trivial. This10
approach also preserves the L-triviality-based accounts of the other acceptability patterns11
in (1)-(3) (see Del Pinal 2019, Chierchia 2019), and supports various additional applications12
of Logicality that we discuss in §4-§5. Before introducing competing approaches to the13
over-generation problem compatible with Semantic Minimalism, let me clarify how Logicality14
+ Modulated LFs relates to broader Contextualist approaches to logical form.15
At this point, it is easy to see why not just any version of Contextualism will work16
as a suitable partner of Logicality. Specifically, radical versions of Contextualism in which17
all terms are subject to modulation (cf. Carston 2002, Recanati 2004, 2010) systematically18
under-generate assignments of unacceptability in the kinds of cases considered here. Suppose19
that the meaning of any term, including functional/logical ones, could be modulated so as20
to increase the utility of assertions (where rescuing an assertion from strict unacceptability21
would be a special case of this function). On this view, we could parse an exceptive sentence22
like (22) as in (22a), i.e., with a modulation operator over exceptive but (I omit other possible23
modulations for simplicity). We have seen that what makes left-upward entailing quantifiers24
such as some generate trivial readings in these sentences is the ‘least you can take out’25
condition (=(iii)) of but. Accordingly, we could rescue assertions of (22) and the like from26
triviality via a modulation operation that simply drops that condition, and outputs a bare set27
subtraction meaning, as captured in (22b).28
(22) *Some students but the lazy ones passed the exam.29
a. Modulated LF:30




(i) Jlazy onesK 6= ∅ ∧
(ii) JsomeK(JstudentsK − Jlazy studentsK)(JpassedK) = 133
In this case, (22) comes out as contingent—e.g., it is false in worlds in which no students34
passed, and true in worlds in which at least one student who is not amongst the lazy ones35
passed (including worlds in which all the lazy students also passed). Accordingly, allowing36
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modulation over functional terms would result in the incorrect prediction that (22) has an1
acceptable reading, paraphrasable as ‘at least some students who are not amongst the lazy2
ones passed the exam’. In general, positions that allow for modulation to operate over3
functional terms make systematically incorrect ‘over-rescuing’ predictions. This result is4
important because radical Contextualism remains an attractive position amongst philosophers5
of language—yet it is simply not a viable position for those who also accept Logicality.6
Logicality + Modulated LFs qualifies as a constrained version of Contextualism due to7
two core features of the modulation operator R. First, R is attached exclusively to non-logical8
terms, where the target class includes content terms like John and red and individual and9
predicate variables. Second, R may result in non-trivial modulations—including those that10
‘rescue’ expressions which would otherwise be informationally useless—but can also simply11
compute the identity function. Insofar as we go for a moderate form of Contextualism, these12
constrains seem natural, and as we will see in §4, both have desirable empirical consequences.13
Radical Contextualist may hold that there is no strict distinction between logical and non-14
logical terms relevant to modulation, and/or that interpreters are required to non-trivially15
modulate all token uses of (non-logical) terms. Still, we can explore a constrained Contextualist16
approach in which there is a distinction between logical and non-logical terms which affects17
the domain on modulation, and in which terms that in principle may be modulated are only18
non-trivially modulated under certain conditions. On this approach, functional/logical terms19
such as quantifiers, coordinators and modals form a relatively closed class system such that20
token uses of them can’t be synchronically modulated, while content terms such as nouns,21
verbs and variables of the same semantic types form a relatively open system such that22
uses of them can be synchronically modulated to increase the coherence/informativeness of23
utterances. How to precisely separate the logical and non-logical terms is of course a difficult24
issue; yet it is one that, as we will see, any viable approach to the over-generation problem25
needs to face (we revisit this issue in §6).26
3.2 Semantic Minimalism as Logicality + Skeletons27
Consider next a Minimalist-friendly notion of logical form that can be paired with Logicality28
to tackle the over-generation problem. The key stipulation, due to Gajewski (2002), is that29
the DS operates over a level of representation—called ‘logical skeletons’—that is ‘blind’ to30
the identity and specific content of all non-logical terms (see also Fox & Hackl 2007, Gajewski31
2009, Chierchia 2006, 2013, Abrusán 2011). The resulting package—quite popular amongst32
proponents of Logicality as an approach to the over-generation problem—is captured in (23):33
(23) Logicality + Logical Skeletons34
a. Language and its DS ‘see’ only ‘logical skeletons’: representations that are35
underspecified with respect to the meaning/identity of their non-logical terms.36
Expressions whose skeletons can be proven trivial are marked as unacceptable.37
b. To obtain the logical skeleton of an LF α38
(i) Identify the maximal constituents of α containing no logical terms39
(ii) Replace each such constituent with a fresh constant of the same type.40
On this view, the DS is radically ‘blind’ to all non-logical terms—crucially, it does not even41
see when two content tokens are tokens of the same content/non-logical term. Accordingly,42
13
Del Pinal, November 20, 2020
the logical skeletons of our basic target examples would look roughly as in (24a) and (25a).1
Note that in (25a) each token of rain is replaced with a new variable of the same type.2
(24) *Some students but John passed the exam3
a. Skeleton:4
[[ Some [ P<e,t>s [ but S<e> ]]] [ V<e,<e,t>-ed the E<e,t> ]]5
(25) It is raining and it is not raining.6
a. Skeleton:7
[[ It is P<e,t>-ing ] [ and [ it is not R<e,t>-ing ]]]8
To complete this account, we have to specify which subset of the trivial sentences are marked9
as unacceptable, i.e., we have to define the set of ‘L-trivial’ sentences:10
(26) L-triviality with Skeletons11
(i) A sentence is L-trivial iff its logical skeleton = 1 (or 0) for all interpretations in12
which it is defined.13
(ii) A sentence is strictly unacceptable if it is or contains an L-trivial sentence.14
Logical skeletons correspond (roughly) to a level of syntactic representation advanced on15
independent grounds by work in distributional morphology, according to which content/open-16
class terms are inserted ‘late’ in the derivation process (Marantz 1994, Harley 2014). From17
this perspective, it is not ad hoc to stipulate that the DS applies at a stage of processing in18
which only the functional skeleton of expressions is explicitly represented.19
To see why Logicality + Skeletons helps with the over-generation problem, consider why20
it predicts that acceptable, superficial trivialities are not L-trivial while still supporting the21
triviality-based account of acceptability patterns with exceptive-but sentences. It is easy to22
check that, based on their skeletons, superficial trivialities such as (25) do not come out as23
L-trivial, hence are not marked as strictly unacceptable. Simply consider an interpretation24
of P and R in which they are not equivalent. Logicality + Skeletons also makes the right25
predictions for the target patterns with exceptive-but sentences. The basic contrast is repeated26
in (27) and (28). The skeleton in (27a) can come out as true or false depending on the values27
assigned to P1, P2 and P3. In contrast, the skeleton in (28a) can never come out as true.28
Given the entry for but in (10), I(P2) 6= ∅ (= condition (i)), otherwise (28) is false (or a29
presupposition failure). Against that constraint, take any interpretation of P1 . . . P3 which30
satisfies (ii). To check if the ‘least you can take out condition’ (= condition (iii)) can be31
satisfied, let S = ∅. Since some is left-upward-entailing, the antecedent of (iii) will be satisfied32
while the consequent is false for any non-empty interpretation of P2. Accordingly, (28) comes33
out as trivially false (whenever defined), and is correctly marked as unacceptable.34
(27) Every student but John passed the exam35




(i) I(P2) 6= ∅ ∧
(ii) JeveryK(I(P1)− I(P2))(I(P3)) = 1 ∧
(iii) ∀S[JeveryK(I(P1)− S)(I(P3)) = 1→ I(P2) ⊆ S]
38
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(28) *Some students but John passed the exam.1
a. Logical skeleton: [[some [P1 [but P2]]] P3]2
b. Interpretation: [Trivially false]3
= 1 iff

(i) I(P2) 6= ∅ ∧
(ii) JsomeK(I(P1)− I(P2))(I(P3)) = 1 ∧
(iii) ∀S[JsomeK(I(P1)− S)(I(P3)) = 1→ I(P2) ⊆ S]
4
Summing up, we have seen that if we assume that the system that searches for ‘trivialities’5
runs on skeletons, we capture (roughly) the correct distinction between superficial trivialities6
and strictly unacceptable L-trivialities. Although again we have derived this result for only7
one case—connected but-exceptives—the acceptability patterns for the other cases in (1)-8
(3) can also arguably be derived from the triviality vs. contingency of the corresponding9
logical skeletons (see Gajewski 2002, 2008a, 2009, Chierchia 2013).5 In addition, Logicality10
+ Skeletons need not posit that all or most content terms include genuine context-sensitive11
parameters. In other words, holding that there is a level of processing in which the identity of12
content/open-class terms is ignored is compatible with holding that, once the identity and13
semantic values of these terms are recovered, most of them don’t have any context-sensitive14
parameters. Logicality + Skeletons, then, is a reasonable approach to over-generation which15
postulates a grammatically-relevant level of representation that is fully compatible with the16
commitments of Semantic Minimalism.17
4 Modulated LFs vs. Skeletons: Superficial trivialities with bound variables18
We have seen that pairing Logicality with either Modulated Logical Forms (the Contextualist-19
friendly option) or Logical Skeletons (the Minimalist-friendly option) helps with the over-20
generation problem. Specifically, each package can explain why some basic cases of superficially21
trivial sentences are not marked as strictly unacceptable, while supporting the derivation22
of L-triviality for the target expressions in acceptability patterns, such as (1)-(3), which23
capture the distribution of various kinds of functional terms and phrases. However, there24
is a class of cases, to which we now turn, that can discriminate between those proposals.25
The key examples are similar to superficial contradictions and tautologies, except that the26
content terms that generate the trivialities are either syntactically co-bound or in some kind27
of anaphoric dependency relation. I will argue that, for these kinds of superficial trivialities,28
Logicality + Skeletons, but not Logicality + Modulated LFs, systematically over-generates29
unacceptability assignments.30
4.1 Predicate co-binding in superficial trivialities31
According to Skeletons, the identity of content terms is not encoded at the level of representa-32
tion accessible to the DS: e.g., superficial contradictions like It is raining and not raining are33
‘seen’ roughly as It is P and it is not Q. This helps explain why some superficial trivialities34
5 Yet note that Del Pinal (2019) argues that Logicality + Skeletons has difficulties supporting L-
triviality-based accounts of negative polarity items, such as the one defended in Chierchia (2013)
(see also §5.2 below). Abrusán (2014) also discusses various acceptability patterns—which arguably
call for triviality-based explanation—that are hard to capture based on the skeletons of the relevant
expressions.
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are acceptable. However, we can construct acceptable superficial trivialities which induce1
various kinds of syntactic co-dependencies between the target content terms. Crucially, it is2
hard to deny that these kinds of co-dependencies—especially binding relations—are encoded3
in the functional skeletons of expressions. In these cases, L-triviality can be proven from their4
corresponding skeletons, but not, I will argue, from their modulated LFs.5
Consider first superficially trivial expressions with co-bound predicate variables, such as6
(29). Suppose the level of representation where grammaticality is determined is blind to the7
identity of non-logical terms like smart. Still, the structure with co-binding ensures that,8
whichever specific predicate is ultimately selected, it must co-occur in both conjuncts, as9
captured in (29a). Since (29a) is L-trivial, (29) is incorrectly predicted to feel ungrammatical.10
In contrast, consider the modulated LF of (29) in (29b). Since each instance of the co-bound11
predicate can be modulated in slightly different ways, the DS can’t derive L-triviality, and12
(29) is correctly predicted to feel strictly acceptable.613
(29) Smart is what John is and isn’t.14
a. P is [what1 John is t1 and is not t1]15
b. Smart is [what1 John is Rc′(t1) and is not Rc′′(t1)]16
To make the same point with a slightly different example, consider the embedded question in17
(30). Since its syntactic skeleton has to encode binding information, as captured in (30a),18
L-triviality can be easily derived. So (30) is incorrectly predicted to be strictly unacceptable.19
In contrast, L-triviality is not derivable from the modulated LF for (30), captured in (30c),20
which can support modulated meanings such as (30d):21
(30) I wonder what John is and isn’t...22
a. what1 John is t1 and is not t123
b. J(30a)K ≈ {p: ∃Q[p = John is Q and John is not Q]}24
c. what1 John is Rc′(t1) and is not Rc′′(t1)25
d. J(30c)K ≈ {John is a typical cousin and not a good cousin, John is a typical26
friend and not a good friend, John is a typical partner and not a good partner,27
. . . }28
These kinds of superficial trivialities with predicate co-binding are not just strictly acceptable—29
in some cases, they are easy to produce and interpret. Imagine that Mary and Peter are30
perplexed by John’s recent selfish behavior:31
(31) a. Peter: I wonder what John is and is not . . .32
b. Mary: A friend . . .33
In this case, Mary’s assertion can be naturally interpreted as saying that John is a friend in34
one sense, but also not a friend in some other, perhaps deeper sense.35
6 A defender of Skeletons can respond that the meaning of smart is a character whose parameters have
to be saturated in its local context. This kind of response might work for some examples of superficial
trivialities with co-binding, such as (29), but it is not a generalizable strategy for Semantic Minimalists.
For we can easily construct examples that are structurally like (29) except that the co-bound predicates
are not, given basic Minimalist commitments, context-sensitive characters/terms.
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Interestingly, given standard accounts of ellipsis and other forms of de-accentuation,71
even quite simple variants of our original superficial trivialities arguably present a challenge2
to Skeletons, as pointed out by Sauerland (2017), but not to Modulated LFs. To see why,3
assume a structural account of ellipsis, according to which elided material is subject to some4
kind of (anaphoric) syntactic and/or semantic identity constraint, as captured in (32a)-(32b).5
Note that our original examples of superficial trivialities, such as (33a), don’t involve ellipsis6
or de-accentuation. It is thus reasonable to assume that no identity condition is explicitly7
imposed over the tokens of the predicates which generate the superficial contradiction. This8
means that we can generate a skeleton as in (33b), which is not L-trivial.9
(32) a. Jasmine is smart but John isn’t.10
b. Jasmine is smart1 but John isn’t smart111
(33) a. John is smart and he isn’t smart.12
b. John is P and he isn’t Q13
Yet consider simple variants of (33a) with ellipsis, such as the superficial trivialities in (34a)14
and (35a). The problem for Skeletons is that the syntactic licensing condition has to encode15
the information that the elided predicate is anaphoric or copied from the non-elided one,16
as captured in (34b) and (35b). That is, logical/functional skeletons must encode that co-17
identity information, even if the specific interpretation of the predicate is ignored at this level.18
The problem, of course, is that structures like (34b) and (35b) are L-trivial. In contrast,19
the corresponding modulated LFs in (34c) and (35c) meet the syntactic/semantic identity20
condition on the elided predicate, do not come out as L-trivial, and can be used to explain21
why these expressions support a reading like ‘John is smart in some sense and isn’t smart in22
some other sense’.823
(34) a. John is and isn’t smart.24
b. John is smart1 and isn’t smart125
c. John is Rc′(smart1) and isn’t Rc′′(smart1)26
(35) a. John is smart, but he also isn’t.27
7 See, e.g., Rooth (1992); for a survey of recent accounts of ellipsis, see Merchant (2019).
8 This analysis seems to assume that, in cases like (34a) and (35a), R is not part of the copied material,
which some might find questionable. Yet even if we assume that the syntactic and/or semantic identity
condition applies also to R, we would still get the same result. This is because, in general, elided
context-sensitive terms are interpreted in their local context as determined by their LF position. To
see this, consider examples like (ia)-(ib):
(i) a. Serena Williams is a great tennis player, and you are one as well.
b. The dutch basketball team is very tall, and so is their football team.
A coach can assert (ia), to motivate a junior player, and use different standards for what counts as
a ‘great player’ for Serena Williams vs. for junior players. Similarly, a fan can assert (ib) and use
different standards for what it is to count as a ‘tall team’ for a basketball vs. a football team. This kind
of flexibility is systematically exhibited by elided (context-sensitive) material. While this observation
is compatible with a syntactic identity condition, it suggests that a semantic identity condition should
in the first instance apply to characters. Either way, we can maintain our basic account of why the
modulated LFs of the target superficial trivialities with ellipsis are not L-trivial (see also §5.2).
17
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b. John is smart1 but he also isn’t smart11
c. John is Rc′(smart1) but he also isn’t Rc′′(smart1)2
4.2 Reflexives in superficial trivialities3
Logicality + Skeletons, but not Logicality + Modulated LFs, also over-generates unaccept-4
ability assignments for superficial trivialities with reflexives (Chierchia 2019).9 Consider5
the deceptively simple example in (36). Assuming a bound variable account of reflexives—6
according to which reflexives have to be bound in their local syntactic environment (Chomsky7
1981, Heim & Kratzer 1998)—(36) has an LF as in (36a). Due to the presence of binding,8
(36a) can be easily shown to be L-trivial, even given its skeleton. As a result, Skeletons9
incorrectly predicts that (36) is unacceptable.10 In contrast, Modulated LFs says that R10
is triggered as a sister of any referential type, including variables of type e (or < s, e >).11
Accordingly, the modulated LF for (36) is roughly as in (36b), which is not L-trivial because12
the modulation can be different at each local context for R.13
(36) John is not himself14
a. John λxi[xi is not himselfi]15
b. John λxi[Rc′(xi) is not Rc′′(himselfi)]16
c. John is not behaving (today) the way he usually behaves.17
The hypothesis that (36) has the modulated LF in (36b) helps explain why it can get the18
reading paraphrased in (36c). If we assume, for simplicity, that proper names and variables19
over individuals are of type < e >, this means that R can map individuals of type < e > into20
individual concepts of type < s, e >. In the case at hand, Rc′′ maps John to an individual21
level concept like ‘the individual that behaves (in the current situation) most similarly to how22
John usually behaves’ (while Rc′ is ‘lazy’, i.e., is resolved to the identity function).1123
Like superficial trivialities with predicate co-binding, acceptable superficial trivialities24
with reflexives occur in many kinds of constructions. Consider reflexives in comparatives25
9 The problem of acceptable, superficial trivialities with reflexives is briefly discussed by Gajewski
(2009), focusing on Skeletons. Del Pinal (2019) tried to deal with these cases without assuming that
modulation applies to variables over individuals. The account I present below builds on the recent
proposal by Chierchia (2019) to extend the domain of modulation to variables over individuals.
10 Could proponents of Skeletons reply that the DS is also blind to the English copula is and treats it as
one amongst various other possible relations? That is, can Skeletons treat the copula as an open-class
term? This is implausible (see Gajewski 2002, 2009, Abrusán 2014, Del Pinal 2019, Chierchia 2019).
First, the copula is syntactically a prototypical functional item. Second, semantic criteria such as
identity under domain permutations classify identity as an unambiguous logical constant. Third,
treating identity as a non-logical term doesn’t help with variants of the basic cases which don’t involve
the use of the copula, such as superficial trivialities with reflexives in comparatives (discussed below).
11 Chierchia (2019) argues that this application of modulation over individuals is independently supported
by an influential approach to de re (and de se) belief. Briefly, the challenge in the de re case is to
explain why (ia) can be used to express a non-contradictory belief of John towards his actual brother,
appropriate to scenarios like (ib).
(i) a. John believes that his brother is not his brother.
b. John believes that his actual brother is in fact an impostor trying to steal John’s
inheritance.
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such as (37). For the analysis, assume a degree semantics for comparatives where adjectives1
correspond to relations between individuals and degrees (e.g., Kennedy 2007). The standard2
LF in (37a) is L-trivial, and generating its skeleton doesn’t help due to the presence of the3
reflexive. In contrast, the modulated LF in (37b) is not L-trivial, which is the desired result.4
(37) John was more eloquent than himself.5
a. Johni λxi[xi was MORE(eloquent) than himselfi]6
= λxi[MORE(eloquent)(xi)(xi)] (Johni)7
where for any u, MORE(eloquent)(u) is the property of being more eloquent8
than u defined as follows:9
u′ has the property of being more eloquent than u iff there is some10
degree d such that u′ is at least d-eloquent and u is not d-eloquent.11
b. Johni λxi[Rc′(xi) was MORE(eloquent) than Rc′′(himselfi)]12
= λxi[MORE(eloquent)(Rc′(xi))(Rc′′(xi))] (Johni)13
Superficial trivialities with reflexives such as (37) are not only strictly acceptable but even14
quite easy to interpret. Suppose that it is common ground between Mary and Peter that15
John’s speeches are usually quite bad. One odd Monday, however, John’s speech was amazing,16
but only Mary was present:17
(38) a. Peter: How did John do today?18
b. Mary: It was unreal! I mean, he was more eloquent than himself.19
Given a modulated LF roughly analogous to (37b), we predict that Mary’s assertion is strictly20
acceptable and can convey something like that John’s degree of eloquence (on that odd21
Monday) was higher than the degree of eloquence that he usually or normally displays.22
4.3 Too much modulation?23
Logicality + Modulated LFs says that the modulation operator, R, appears as a sister of all24
content terms and variables. The account of superficial trivialities with bound variables in25
§4.1-4.2 builds on that assumption. One might worry, however, that while that assumption26
helps with the over-generation problem, it gives too much expressive power to R, thereby27
forcing ‘informative’ readings for superficial tautologies and contradictions. Yet there are28
contexts in which the intended readings are precisely the trivial ones. Consider example (39),29
where the context as updated by the first assertion suggests that the speaker intends that the30
complement of the belief attribution should be assigned its trivial, contradictory reading.31
(39) John is totally irrational. He believes that he will both win and not win the race.32
One influential approach to these cases, going back to Quine (1956), Kaplan (1968) and Cresswell &
Von Stechow (1982), appeals to concepts through which the relevant individual is accessed by the
attitude holder, where a belief is de re about an individual u whenever u reliably induces a concept
in the belief holder a which identifies u for a in a’s belief state. For (ia), such concept might be ‘the
man who wants to share John’s inheritance’. Charlow & Sharvit (2014) propose an implementation of
this approach in which the LFs for de re beliefs include ‘concept generators’, which are inserted in the
syntactic spot of the res and drive pragmatically the propositional content of the belief. According to
Chierchia (2019), the use of modulation over individual terms and variables can arguably be viewed as
an extension of Charlow and Sharvit’s proposal for the semantics de re belief.
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Suppose the embedded clause has a modulated LF as in (40a). This seems to predict that the1
embedded clause gets the reading in (40b), but in (39) the default reading is closer to (40c).2
(40) a. he1 will Rc′(win) ∧ he1 will not Rc′′(win)3
b. John believes that he will win (in one sense of winning) and also that he won’t4
win (in another sense of winning).5
c. John believes, in exactly the same sense of winning, that he will win and not6
win.7
Yet Logicality + Modulated LFs, as presented in §3.1, entails that superficially trivial8
expressions can be assigned trivial readings. On this view, an expressions counts as L-trivial,9
and is thus filtered out, only if it is trivial on every possible modulation (i.e., resolution of R),10
which is obviously not the case for (40a). Still, even in such cases, R can ultimately (i.e., once11
the context is taken into account) be assigned the laziest modulation, i.e., the identity function.12
In the case of (39), this choice would generate the intended reading. From this perspective,13
the second sentence in (39) is trivial but not L-trivial, and is thus correctly predicted to be14
strictly acceptable. Generalizing, Logicality + Modulated LFs entails that some (acceptable)15
expressions which are not L-trivial—since they are not trivial on every possible modulation16
of each token of R—can still be assigned a trivial reading in particular contexts. Indeed,17
Logicality + Modulated LFs is compatible with the view that lazy modulation is the default,18
such that R is only assigned substantial modulation operations when supported by specific19
patterns of focus/intonation, questions under discussion, and similar factors.20
5 Other approaches to Logicality compatible with Semantic Minimalism21
The Contextualist package of Logicality + Modulated LFs, I have argued, is descriptively22
superior to the Semantic Minimalist-friendly package of Logicality + Skeletons. Specifically,23
Logicality + Modulated LFs issues in a more general solution to the over-generation problem24
while preserving L-triviality-based accounts of acceptability patterns, such as those in (1)-25
(3), which help capture the distribution of various functional terms and phrases. For those26
sympathetic to Logicality, this result amounts to a novel argument for Contextualism over27
Semantic Minimalism—but only if there are no other viable implementations of Logicality28
compatible with Minimalism. In this section, I present three additional Minimalist-friendly29
implementations of Logicality, and argue that each option is descriptively inferior, given the30
over-generation problem, to Logicality + Modulated LFs. Unlike Skeletons, these proposals31
have not been explored in the literature; yet each has some prima facie plausibility. Examining32
why they fail will deepen our understanding of the conditions that should be satisfied by any33
viable implementation of Logicality.34
5.1 L-triviality within Phases35
Suppose that the DS sees ‘standard’ (Semantic Minimalist-friendly) logical forms—i.e.,36
textbook syntactic representations, different from both logical skeletons and modulated logical37
forms, where only a special class of terms exhibits linguistically-driven context sensitivity.38
Assume, however, that the DS only checks for trivialities within (and not across) ‘minimal39
syntactic phases’. As a first pass, we can say that a syntactic structure counts as a minimal40
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phase if it can be assigned a propositional type interpretation and has no proper constituents1
that can also be assigned a propositional type interpretation.2
(41) Logicality + Phases. The DS sees standard logical forms and filters out all3
expressions which can be shown to be logically trivial. However, the DS operates only4
within minimal syntactic phases. Expressions whose triviality depends on comparing5
information across minimal phases are not seen as L-trivial by the DS, hence are not6
marked as strictly unacceptable.7
The hypothesis that syntactic structures are computed in phases has some independent8
motivation (Chomsky 1995, Radford 2004). To see why Logicality + Phases has some promise9
as a solution to the over-generation problem, consider again two basic examples of the kinds10
of superficial trivialities that implementations of Logicality should not classify as L-trivial:11
(42) a. If John1 is wrong, then he1 is wrong.12
b. It is raining and it is not raining.13
(42a) and (42b) share the feature that, to identify their triviality, the DS would have to14
look across more than one minimal propositional structure, i.e., it would have to compare15
material across distinct syntactic phases. Specifically, to determine if (42a) is a tautology, the16
DS would have to compare information across two phases, as informally captured in (43a).17
Similarly, to determine if (42b) is a contradiction, it would need to look across two phases, as18
informally captured in (43b):19
(43) a. [If
Min. Phase︷ ︸︸ ︷
[ j1 is W], then
Min. Phase︷ ︸︸ ︷
[he1 is W]]20
b. [[It is R-ing]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Min. Phase
and [it is (not) R-ing]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Min. Phase
]21
Suppose that the DS only checks for trivialities within minimal syntactic phases. It follows that22
superficial trivialities like (42a)-(42b) will not be identified and filtered-out by the DS. This23
holds even if (within each minimal phase) the DS sees otherwise standard logical forms, as in24
(43a)-(43b). In addition, many of the cases of trivialities that do result in ‘ungrammaticality’25
can be proven from minimal propositional clauses. For example, it is easy to check, for our26
account of exceptive-but phrases in §2, that proving the target cases of L-triviality at no point27
depends on comparing material across minimal phases.28
Despite its advantages, Logicality + Phases both over and under-generates unacceptability29
assignments. Starting with over-generation, consider again acceptable superficial trivialities30
with reflexives, such as (44a) and (45a), which as we saw undermine Logicality + Skeletons but31
not Logicality + Modulated LFs. In these cases, each contradiction or tautology can be proven32
within a minimal phase (e.g., no connectives or proposition taking operators are essentially33
involved, and the target reflexives must be bound in their local syntactic environment), as34
can be seen from their partial LFs in (44b) and (45b):35
(44) a. John is (not) himself.36
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(45) a. John is more eloquent than himself.1
b. John [ti is more eloquent than himselfi]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Min. Phase
2
It follows that many simple superficial trivialities with reflexives would, on this proposal,3
come out as L-trivial, and so would be incorrectly predicted to feel ungrammatical.4
Logicality + Phases also under-generates assignments of unacceptability. The Logicality5
program includes triviality-based accounts of the distribution of propositional operators, such6
as attitude verbs. To derive the target trivialities in these cases, the DS would need access to7
the interaction between propositional operators and the content of their complements. As8
examples, consider the two patterns in (46) and (47), both of which have a triviality-based9
explanation. The key point is easy to see (even without getting into details): the relevant10
trivialities in (46a) and (47a) can only be derived if we can compare material within a minimal11
propositional phase (the embedded clauses) with operators outside of it (the attitude verbs).1212
Accordingly, if the DS could only prove trivialities within minimal phases, it would not filter13
out as L-trivial (unacceptable) expression such as (46a) and (47a).1314
(46) Attitude verbs and interrogative embedding: (Mayr 2019)15
a. *John believes whether Mary smokes.16
b. John knows whether Mary smokes.17
(47) Weak presuppositional islands: (Abrusán 2011)18
a. *How do you regret that Mary fixed the roof?19
b. How do you hope that Mary fixed the roof?20
The problems of over and under-generation of unacceptability assignments, taken together,21
amount to a serious dilemma for Logicality + Phases—and it is hard to imagine a reasonable22
modification of the notion of minimal phases that can avoid it. On the one hand, to block23
the incorrect assignment of L-triviality for simple sentences with reflexives such as (44a)24
and (44b), minimal phases would have to involve ‘small’ syntactic structures with arguably25
sub-propositional type interpretations. On the other hand, to prove L-triviality for cases26
that require access to the interaction between propositional operators and their complements,27
such as (46a) and (47a), minimal phases would have to involve rather inclusive syntactic28
structures which may have structures with propositional type interpretations as proper sub-29
constituents. It is hard to see how a coherent and independently motivated notion of phases30
might satisfy both of these constraints, since they pull in opposite directions with respect to31
the size-complexity of the kinds of structures that are evaluated for triviality by the DS.32
5.2 Exotic Deductive Systems33
Another way of pairing Semantic Minimalism with Logicality is to assume that the DS34
implements a non-classical ‘natural’ logic. Many acceptable superficial trivialities, given35
12 For demonstration that those accounts of the distribution of attitude verbs can be implemented in
Logicality + Modulated LFs, see Del Pinal (2019).
13 Another prominent triviality-based account which also depends on the interaction between propositional
operators and their complements is Chierchia’s account of the distribution of negative polarity items,
already mentioned in §1 and discussed in more detail in §5.2 below.
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their standard logical forms, correspond to simple cases of classically trivial formulas: e.g.,1
violations of the law of non-contradiction. By adopting a non-standard logic for the DS—e.g.,2
a relevant logic which allows for p ∧ ¬p to be contingent (i.e., to have some true and some3
false instantiations)—we can restrict the over-generation of unacceptability for superficial4
trivialities. And we can do this without holding that skeletons are a level of syntactic5
representation—for the non-classical DS can run directly on standard LFs.6
(48) Logicality + Exotic DS. The DS interfaces with standard (Semantic Minimalist-7
friendly) logical forms. However, the kind of ‘natural logic’ implemented by the DS8
is closer to relevant logics (or to even more exotic systems) than to classical logics.9
All expressions which are trivial relative to the exotic DS are classified as L-trivial,10
and hence filtered out as strictly unacceptable.11
What is the advantage of modeling the DS as a relevant logic (or an even weaker system)?12
The proposal to run the DS on skeletons in which each content term token is replaced with a13
new variable of the appropriate type basically mimics some results of such non-classical logics:14
e.g., it is raining and not raining comes out as contingent because it is ‘seen’ by the DS as ‘it15
is P and it is not Q’. The main objection we raised in §4 against Skeletons concerns cases in16
which, due to binding or some syntactic/semantic identity constraint on ellipsis, the identity17
of content term tokens is explicitly encoded by the Grammar. By directly modeling the DS18
as a relevant logic, one may avoid that objection. For on this implementation, formulas like19
‘it is P and not P’—seen as such by the DS—come out as strictly contingent, hence are not20
filtered out by the DS, even if the tokens of ‘P’ are co-bound in any way.21
Unfortunately, Logicality + Exotic DS faces a dilemma. To fully solve the over-generation22
problem, not only superficial contradictions, but even tautologies like if it is raining, then it23
is raining would have to come out as contingent. Yet ‘if P then P’ and various other basic24
examples of superficial tautologies are valid in relevant logics; hence would come out as L-trivial25
if the DS is modeled as a relevant logic which runs on standard LFs. The problem, of course,26
is that such superficial tautologies are in general as acceptable as superficial contradictions.27
This suggests that to fully deal with the over-generation problem, this direct approach would28
have to adopt an extremely weak logic for the DS.14 The problem with adopting a weak logic29
for the DS, however, is that many of the triviality-based accounts which make Logicality such30
a powerful hypothesis depend on the validity of various classical formulas and inference rules,31
such as the LNC, MP and MT.32
To illustrate this, consider a simplified version of Chierchia’s (2013) triviality-based account33
of the distribution of negative polarity items (NPIs), focusing on the case of any. The basic34
contrast, presented in (3), is repeated below in (50) and (51). Chierchia argues that any is an35
indefinite with existential force which, unlike its plain counterpart a/an, triggers obligatory36
exhaustification of domain alternatives, ODA, defined as in (49):37
14 Indeed, proponents of this package would arguably be forced to hold that the DS is as weak as, say,
Korner’s (1955) logic for vagueness/inexact concepts (cf. Gajewski 2009). As discussed in Williamson
(1994), this system provides truth-tables for the connectives that basically treat each token of a
propositional variable as independent (even in formulas like p ∧ p), so that the resulting ‘logic’ is
extremely weak. In itself, this might not be a totally unattractive position for a Semantic Minimalist
who holds that, while most open-class terms aren’t context-sensitive, all or most of them are vague.
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(49) a. JODA φKg,w = JφKg,w ∧
negate d-alternatives not entailed by φ︷ ︸︸ ︷
∀p ∈ JφKDA[p→ λw′JφKg,w′ ⊆ p]1
b. JφKDA = {JφK : D′ ⊆ g(D)}2
In (50), any occurs in a downward-entailing environment. Suppose for simplicity that the3
relevant domain is John’s house, which has just a living room and a kitchen. Since the4
prejacent of ODA entails each of its domain alternatives in (50b), exhaustification is in this5
case vacuous, as captured in (50c). The result is obviously a contingent statement which can6
be true or false depending on whether John has any eggs in the world of evaluation.7
(50) John doesn’t have any eggs.8
a. ODA [¬John has an egg ∈ Dhouse]9
b. DA = {¬John has an egg ∈ Dhouse, ¬John has an egg ∈ Dkitchen,10
¬John has an egg ∈ Dliving room}11
c. J(50a)K = ¬John has an egg ∈ Dhouse12
In contrast, in (51) any occurs in an upward-entailing environment. As a result, this account13
now generates trivial truth-conditions. To see why, notice that the prejacent of ODA—namely,14
that John has an egg in the house—entails neither its alternative that John has an egg in15
the kitchen, nor its alternative that John has an egg in the living room. Given the definition16
of ODA in (49), this means that each of these alternatives has to be negated, as captured17
in (51c). This generates a contradiction, since by assumption the domain of John’s house18
consists just of the subdomains of the kitchen and living room.19
(51) *John has any eggs.20
a. ODA [John has an egg ∈ Dhouse]21
b. DA = {John has an egg ∈ Dhouse, John has an egg ∈ Dkitchen,22
John has an egg ∈ Dliving room}23
c. J(51a)K = John has an egg ∈ Dhouse ∧ ¬John has an egg ∈ Dkitchen24
∧ ¬John has an egg ∈ Dliving room25
What is crucial to note, for us, is that this account depends on the assumption that the DS26
can identify and filter out violations of the LNC, such as (51c). Yet this is precisely what we27
would have to reject if we assume that the DS directly implements a non-classical logic in28
which the LNC is not valid. Like Chierchia’s account of NPIs, many other triviality-based29
accounts that make up the Logicality program depend on the stipulation that the DS is a30
rather powerful inferential system.31
At this point, it is important to understand why, given Chierchia’s account of NPIs,32
Logicality + Modulated LFs filters out expressions like (51) but not superficial contradictions.33
Consider the modulated LF of (51) in (52a). The modulation function R can apply to any34
open-class term in the prejacent of ODA. Once any modulations are inserted into the LF35
for the prejacent, the formal alternatives are determined from the subdomains of Dhouse, as36
illustrated in (52b).37
(52) a. ODA [John has an Rc′(egg) ∈ Dhouse]38
b. DA = {John has an Rc′(egg) ∈ D′: D′ ⊆ Dhouse}39
24
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Suppose that egg is modulated to ‘expensive egg’; we would still derive a contradiction when1
we exhaustify as in (52a) over the domain alternatives in (52b). The key assumption here is2
that the interpretation of non-focused terms, even if they are context-sensitive characters,3
remains constant across formal alternatives. This assumption is independently justified. To4
see why, consider the exhaustified (scalar) reading of (53), focusing on the behavior of tall,5
a paradigmatic context-sensitive term. Although its context-sensitive parameters can be6
saturated in different ways in its local context—to capture different thresholds for counting as7
‘tall’—that interpretation has to be held constant across the formal alternatives (in this case8
scalar alternatives = SA) used by the exhaustification operator, as captured in (53b).9
(53) SomeF students are tall.10
a. OSA(SomeF students are tallc′)11
b. SA = {Some students are tallc′ , All students are tallc′}12
c. Some students are tallc′ ∧ ¬All students are tallc′13
d. Some students are tallc′ ∧ ¬All students are tallc′′14
This explains why (53) can have the enriched reading in (53c) but not the one in (53d), i.e.,15
why (53) cannot be enriched to mean something like ‘some students are tall given threshold16
A, but not all students are tall given higher threshold B’. In contrast, it is clearly possible to17
switch standards when tall occurs in two different local contexts at LF, such as in (54):18
(54) My students are tall for US standards, but they aren’t tall for Dutch standards.19
In short, the principles which guarantee that paradigmatic context-sensitive terms like tall are20
assigned uniform interpretations across formal (scalar) alternatives in structures like (53a),21
but not in (54), also guarantee that R, which is also a context-sensitive operator, must be22
assigned a uniform interpretation across domain alternatives in examples like (52), but not23
when it occurs in different sites at LF such as in typical superficial trivialities.24
5.3 Anti-triviality clauses25
The third attempt to square Semantic Minimalism with Logicality—to tackle the over-26
generation problem—is based on a technical trick. As pointed out by Chierchia (2013), we27
can eliminate, from our theory of the language system, the notion of a DS or natural logic28
that identifies and filters out L-triviality by introducing specific anti-triviality clauses into29
the semantic entries for certain functional terms. Using this technique, we can try to reduce30
L-triviality to presupposition failure.31
(55) Logicality as anti-triviality presuppositions. The language system doesn’t32
include a DS that identifies and filters out L-trivial expressions. Instead, many func-33
tional/logical terms include, as part of their meaning, anti-triviality presuppositions.34
The class of L-trivial expressions can be reduced to that of expressions which violate35
such anti-triviality clauses.36
Schematic examples of lexical entries with anti-triviality presuppositions for (domain alternatives-37
based) exhaustification and exceptive-but are presented in (56b) and (57b). Given (56b),38
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trivial sentences with NPIs like (56a) come out as presupposition failures; and given (57b),1
trivial sentences with exceptive phrases like (57a) also come out as presupposition failures.2
(56) a. *Sam has any philosophy books3
b. O∗DA(φ) =
{
# if ODA(φ) is trivial;
ODA(φ) otherwise
4
(57) a. *[[ThreeD [athletesA [but JohnC ]]] smokeP ]5
b. but∗(C)(A)(D)(P) =
{
# if but(C)(A)(D)(P ) is trivial;
but(C)(A)(D)(P ) otherwise
6
This strategy can be generalized: i.e., we can re-write the semantic entries for certain functional7
terms so that what we originally classified as L-triviality-based cases of unacceptability result8
instead from violations of explicit anti-triviality clauses. Since the trivialities that result in9
unacceptability are encoded in specific lexical entries, we avoid the over-generation problem,10
at least in its original form. As a result, this version of Semantic Minimalism need not appeal11
to logical skeletons, and is thus not directly undermined by the problems raised against12
Logicality + Skeletons in §4.13
This use of anti-triviality clauses in the entries for functional terms, however, faces serious14
obstacles. According to Logicality, there is a subset of the trivial sentences, the ‘L-trivial’15
ones, which are unacceptable. According to Logicality + Modulated LFs, we can derive the16
empirically correct set of L-trivial sentences—hence address the over-generation problem—17
on the basis of independently justified assumptions about functional terms and the kind of18
context-sensitivity characteristic of the content-based lexicon. This suggests a rationale for why19
L-trivial sentences are unacceptable, while merely trivial ones are strictly acceptable: merely20
trivial sentences can convey (useful) information, depending on the selected modulations,21
whereas L-trivial ones are not even potentially useful, i.e., they are unrecoverable under all22
possible modulations. Contrast that picture with the one suggested by the anti-triviality23
account. The problem is not just that it seems pointless to write a specific anti-triviality24
presupposition clause into the semantic entry of each functional/logical term involved in25
triviality-driven acceptability patterns. It is rather that this account doesn’t come with an26
independent rationale for deciding when to include such anti-triviality clauses. As a result, we27
end up with an ad hoc procedure that faces its own version of the over-generation problem.28
For if natural languages can encode anti-triviality clauses, why don’t they do so for29
all functional/logical terms? For example, why don’t the entries for and and or include30
anti-triviality clauses that filter out trivial conjunctions and disjunctions? Obviously, these31
entries would over-generate unacceptability for many superficial tautologies and contradictions,32
given standard logical forms without modulation operators (i.e., given Minimalist-friendly33
logical forms). For example, given anti-triviality conjunction, and*, defined as in (58), a34
superficial contradiction like (59) would be incorrectly predicted to be unacceptable, given its35
standard LF in (59a). This prediction is blocked by adopting the modulated LF in (59b), but36
this option is not in general available to theorists opting for a Semantic Minimalist-friendly37
implementation of anti-triviality clauses.38
(58) and*(p)(q) =
{
# if p ∧ q is trivial;
p ∧ q otherwise39
26
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(59) It is raining and it is not raining1
a. Standard LF: [It is P [and not it is P]]2
b. Modulated LF: [It is Rc′(P) [and not it is Rc′′(P)]]3
In short, proponents of this view need to explain why only some functional terms encode4
anti-triviality clauses. The rationale cannot be that, relative to their standard logical forms,5
such clauses filter out logically trivial and hence informationally useless expressions, for this6
wouldn’t explain why connectives like and and or don’t also incorporate anti-triviality clauses.7
In addition, they would also have to specify which kinds of presupposition failures generate8
judgements of strict unacceptability. According to most extant theories, the observational9
signature of presupposition failures is something like ‘intuitive’ oddness (cf. It is raining,10
but John knows it isn’t raining), or uncertainty concerning truth-value assignments given11
all the relevant facts and controlling for vagueness (cf. The current King of France is bald).12
These observational signatures should be distinguished from strict unacceptability, which13
is closer to the feeling of ungrammaticality. Accordingly, and as pointed out in Chierchia14
(2013), proponents of Logicality as anti-triviality would have to explain why some but not all15
presupposition failures give rise to judgements of strict unacceptability. The challenge can be16
seen more directly in (60a)-(60c). All these expressions involve, given the anti-triviality view,17
some kind of presupposition failure, but only (60a) feels strictly unacceptable:18
(60) a. *Sue broke any cups.19
b. ?I met an Italian that turned out not to be Italian.20
c. ?Mary knows a pilot who is not a pilot.21
The project of specifying which subset of presupposition failures gives rise to strict unaccept-22
ability is as hard as that of specifying which subset of trivial sentences counts as L-trivial, i.e.,23
gives rise to strict unacceptability. The problem, of course, is that the anti-triviality proposal24
was presented, at this point in our dialectic, as a general solution to the latter project.25
6 Logical vs. non-logical words and the domain of modulation26
In §4-§5, I argued that the Contextualist-friendly package of Logicality + Modulated LFs27
constitutes a more satisfactory approach to the over-generation problem than various im-28
plementations of Logicality which are compatible with Semantic Minimalism. To conclude29
my argument, I want to clarify and justify a key assumption of my approach. According30
to Logicality + Modulated LFs, the modulation operator R is inserted as a sister of all31
non-logical terminal nodes. Although there is an intuitive difference between logical terms32
like determiners, connectives, and modals, and content terms like nouns, adjectives and verbs33
which pick out entities, events, or functions of entities or events, this approach ultimately34
depends on the availability of a more systematic procedure for separating the logical and35
non-logical terms. Indeed, this also applies to other implementations of Logicality: e.g., logical36
skeletons can only be derived from standard logical forms if there is a way of identifying their37
non-logical points. The goal of this section is to explain why I am optimistic that we will38
be able to find a computationally tractable procedure for separating the fixed, logical terms39
of natural languages from the non-logical terms that are open to modulation. My approach40
builds on previous work on the identification of logical constants, esp., on related observations41
by Chierchia (2019).42
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Most of the lexical terms of natural languages that are commonly classified as paradigmat-1
ically logical share a cluster of syntactic and semantic properties (von Fintel 1995, Gajewski2
2009, MacFarlane 2017, Chierchia 2019). Syntactically, logical terms tend to fall on the func-3
tional, closed-class side of the lexicon, while content terms—i.e., referential or world-directed4
terms—fall on the open-class side of the lexicon. In current generative approaches, functional5
terms appear on the edges of noun and verb phrases, forming the ‘extended projections’ of the6
latter, content-based phrases. Semantically, paradigmatic logical terms share two features that7
are important for our purposes. First, they pass a range of invariance tests. There are various8
kinds of invariance tests, some more strict than others (see e.g., van Benthem 1989, McGee9
1996, Sher 2003, Sagi 2014, MacFarlane 2017). For the purposes of implementing Logicality,10
we should use relatively inclusive invariance tests, such as tests that involve permutations of11
the domain of individuals and events which respect to structural differences across domains12
such as the mass/count and the event/state distinctions. Second, paradigmatic logical terms13
tend to be assigned high types. The sorts of terms that pass such inclusive permutation14
invariance tests and are assigned high types includes determiners (every, none, most), connec-15
tives/coordinators (and, or), modals (must, might), exceptives (but, except) and exhaustifiers16
(even, only, O)—i.e., all the terms that we have thus far treated as part of the fixed natural17
logic used by the language system (see Gajewski 2009, Sagi 2014, MacFarlane 2017, Chierchia18
2019). In contrast, content terms—incl., individual and predicate variables—typically fail19
such permutation invariance tests, and are usually assign a ‘low’ semantic type, corresponding20
to their role of standing for individuals, events, or predicates of individuals or events.21
Although there is a significant overlap between the functional, closed-class, permutation22
invariant, and high-typed terms, on the one hand, and the content, open-class, non-permutation23
invariant, and low-typed terms, on the other, there are some mismatches predicted by the24
different criteria within each of these clusters. How we propose to resolve these mismatches25
matters to the (empirical) project of picking out the appropriate set of L-trivial expressions.26
Consider two examples. First, predicates like exists come out as logical when classified27
using certain permutation invariance tests (Gajewski 2009, MacFarlane 2017), but as non-28
logical when classified using its type, namely, that of a one-place predicate akin to made of29
plastic. If we hold that any terms which pass such permutation invariance tests are treated30
as logical constants by the language system, hence not in the domain of R (i.e., not subject31
to modulation), then sentences like Pete exists would come out as L-trivial and incorrectly32
predicted to feel strictly unacceptable. Second, pronouns—including reflexives—are arguably33
part of the functional, closed-class vocabulary, and yet are not permutation invariant and34
their semantic type is, on most accounts, simply that of (variables of) entities (or individual35
level concepts), or of pluralities of entities. If we hold that any terms which are part of the36
closed-class vocabulary are treated as logical constants by the language system, they would37
not be in the domain of R. As a result, superficial trivialities with reflexives such as John is38
not himself today would come out as L-trivial and incorrectly predicted to be unacceptable.39
When considering such mismatches across different criteria for separating the logical from40
the non-logical terms, it is important to appreciate that, given the project of implementing41
Logicality, our goal is not to select a procedure that picks out the ‘true’ logical constants.42
Our goal is the empirical and pragmatic one of selecting a procedure that, when combined43
with our implementation of Logicality, results in an overall theory that determines the correct44
set of L-trivial expressions, i.e., that assigns triviality just to those expressions that, while45
syntactically well-formed, are judged by competent speakers to feel strictly unacceptable. At46
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the same time, it is not appropriate, given that goal, to simply point out that we should use1
these criteria as reliable diagnostics—and not as necessary/sufficient conditions—for picking2
out the language system relative logical terms. For any term (or class of terms) that is3
cross-classified by the criteria within a cluster (e.g., a term that is classified as logical based on4
an invariance test but as non-logical based on its low semantic type), we still have to decide5
whether it is in the domain of modulation. And this choice will partly determine whether we6
derive the correct acceptability patterns for expressions containing that term.7
Which criteria, then, should get the highest weight for picking out the language system8
relative non-logical terms? I propose that the domain of the modulation operator R should be9
determined by the semantic types of its possible arguments. Specifically, R should be treated10
as a constrained polymorphic type operator, which can take as arguments any terms which11
have a ‘referential’ type, relative to the target theory. Given a semantic theory in which the12
basic domains (excluding the truth values) are those of entities and events, R will apply to13
terms and variables of type e, v, and any terms and variables for functions of a type whose first14
element is of type e or v (< e, t >, < e < e, t >>, etc.). This proposal excludes any high typed15
functions from the domain of modulation—i.e., any functions whose first argument is not a16
(non-truth value) basic type. It follows that determiners, connectives/coordinators, modal17
auxiliaries, exceptives and exhaustifiers are not in the domain of modulation, the desired18
result. In addition, this proposal deals nicely with the previous examples of cross-classified19
terms. First, predicates that apply to the entire domain of entities in all models will be treated20
by the language system as content terms and subject to modulation—even if, on some tests,21
they count as permutation invariant (same holds of predicates that are empty in all models).22
This result might seem problematic for certain projects in philosophical logic, but it helps23
pick out the correct set of L-trivial expressions. For then sentences like Pete exists do not24
come out as L-trivial, and are thus correctly predicted to be strictly acceptable (exists can25
be modulated to mean something like ‘exists relative to some relevant world which need not26
be the actual one’). Second, on this view reflexives—taken as bound (individual) variables27
(i.e., of type < e > or < s, e >)—are also in the domain of R, even if they are part of the28
closed-class lexicon. As shown in §4.2, this entails that superficial trivialities with reflexives29
such as John is not himself today do not come out as L-trivial and are correctly predicted to30
be strictly acceptable.31
To be sure, this (preliminary) proposal for specifying the domain of modulation leaves open32
various important issues. For example, future work should examine acceptability patterns33
involving mixed or semi logical terms such as prepositions and propositional attitude verbs34
to determine if those terms are treated by the language system as part of the fixed, logical35
vocabulary or as part of the non-logical terms that are subject to modulation. 15 Those36
results will help inform whether or not expressions of the corresponding semantic types in37
general should be included in the domain of modulation. In addition, relative to semantic38
theories with a strict correspondence between syntactic categories and semantic types, this39
15 For an attempt to reconcile Logicality + Modulated LFs with the view, advocated by Abrusán (2014)
and Mayr (2019), that propositional attitude verbs can trigger systematic patterns of L-triviality, as
illustrated in (46)-(47), see Del Pinal (2019). Briefly, I argue there that although attitude verbs are
subject to modulation, the presuppositions of attitude verbs project from such modifications in the
usual way. As a result, the presupposed factivity (or lack thereof) of the attitude verb is preserved
across all possible modulations, and this is enough to maintain the triviality-based accounts of Abrusán
(2014) and Mayr (2019) of patterns like (46)-(47).
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kind of proposal is relatively deterministic and entails that R will range over nouns, pronouns,1
verbs, adjectives and adverbs. Yet relative to theories that allow for substantial semantic type2
variation within each syntactic category, this proposal leaves open various parameters which3
may be used to explore different ways of fixing the (disputed) boundaries of the domain of R.4
For those interested in constructing an empirically adequate implementation of Logicality,5
this proposal can in turn push assumptions—perhaps even revisionary ones—about which6
semantic types to assign to specific classes of terms.7
7 Conclusion8
The project of finding an implementation of Logicality that can preserve triviality-based9
accounts of the distribution of quantifiers, modals, and exhaustifiers, among other logical10
or semi-logical terms and phrases, without over-generating unacceptability assignments for11
‘superficial’ trivialities opens up a novel way of tackling traditional philosophical disputes about12
the nature of logical form, including ongoing debates between Contextualists and Semantic13
Minimalists. This paper explored various implementations of Logicality compatible with these14
philosophical frameworks. I have argued that each Minimalist-friendly implementation is15
descriptively inadequate as a general solution to the over-generation problem, while pairing16
Logicality with a version of Contextualism results in a more promising approach. I also argued17
that not just any version of Contextualism will work as part of this package: Logicality cannot18
be paired with radical accounts according to which all terms—including logical terms—can19
be modulated. Finally, the discussion of various novel Minimalist-friendly proposals revealed20
some general constraints on any defensible implementation of Logicality: (i) the natural logic21
used by the language system seems to be quite powerful, and should respect most classical22
rules of inference,16 and (ii) triviality-induced unacceptability cannot in general be reduced to23
violations of explicit and lexically encoded anti-triviality presuppositions.24
Semantic Minimalists (and Radical Contextualists) might be tempted to resist these25
results by rejecting the Logicality of language hypothesis. Although the main goal of this26
paper is not to directly defend Logicality, I think that the case studies discussed here illustrate27
the considerable power and elegance of triviality-based explanations of the distribution of28
functional terms and phrases. It is becoming increasingly clear that rejecting Logicality is a29
costly move. Any version of Semantic Minimalism or Contextualism—indeed, any hypothesis30
about the nature of logical form—that depends on that move would have reduced credibility31
as an empirical hypothesis about a level of representation used by the language system and32
its interfaces. For this reason, I hope that even philosophers who ultimately reject the specific33
claims I defend here will be convinced that it is useful to frame traditional debates between34
Semantic Minimalists and Contextualists as debates that are in part about how to implement35
Logicality and understand why some syntactically well-formed sentences are automatically36
filtered out by the language system.37
Logicality also interacts in interesting ways with other ongoing debates in Philosophy of38
Language. First, we have seen that most viable implementations of Logicality (whether via39
Skeletons or Modulated logical forms) depend on a distinction between functional/logical terms40
and content/non-logical terms. Although coming up with a principled distinction between41
16 Recall, however, that the relevant notion of entailment is close to Strawson-entailment. This is because
a (modulated) LF is L-trivial if, whenever defined, it is either trivially true or false (or equivalently, is
entailed by the empty set whenever it is defined) for all possible modulations (see §3.1).
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logical and non-logical terms is difficult, as is well known from related work in philosophical1
logic (van Benthem 1989, Sher 2003, Sagi 2014, MacFarlane 2015), I have argued, following2
Chierchia (2019), that there are good reasons to think that such a distinction plays a central3
role in the architecture of the language system. Still, much works remains to be done to really4
solidify that hypothesis (see §6). Secondly, some Logicality-style accounts assume that the5
DS has access to information that goes beyond strictly ‘logical’ information. For example,6
accounts of modified numerals (Fox & Hackl 2007), negative islands in comparatives (Gajewski7
2008b) and weak presuppositional islands (Abrusán 2014), depend on substantial structural8
assumptions about the domains of numbers, degrees and manners. In other words, they9
require (domain-specific) stipulations about natural language metaphysics. A philosophically10
satisfying implementation of Logicality will have to grapple with these foundational issues at11
the interface of language, logic and metaphysics.12
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